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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did the court below err in holding that federal regulation of
Sheldrake Pond is not justified under either the Commerce
Clause or the Treaty Clause, given that the activity of polluting
Sheldrake Pond, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce and given that the Clean Water Act is a necessary and proper means to the effectuation of the Migratory
Bird Treaty?
2. Did the court below err in finding that Sheldrake Pond is not a
"navigable water" under the Clean Water Act, given that Sheldrake Pond is both a playa lake, the destruction of which affects interstate commerce, and an important habitat for
migratory birds, and given that Congress recently amended the
Clean Water Act to ensure such bodies of water fall under its
jurisdiction?
3. Did the court below err in holding that the lead shot and skeet
parts which fall into and accumulate in Sheldrake Pond are not
solid waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act's regulatory definition covering permit violations, given
that the lead shot and skeet parts are hazardous materials that
are both discarded and abandoned?
4. Did the court below err in holding that the lead shot and skeet
parts which fall into and accumulate in Sheldrake Pond are not
solid waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act's statutory definition of solid waste that presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment, given that lead shot and skeet parts are discarded
hazardous materials?
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Birdwatchers of Groveton, Inc., Appellant
United States, Appellant
Suave Real Properties, Inc., Appellee
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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
AND REGULATIONS
The constitutional provisions relevant to the determination of
this case are the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3,
the Necessary and Proper Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 18,
and the Treaty Clause, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United
States Constitution. All three Clauses are printed in their entirety in Appendix B. The statutes relevant to this case are the
Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1994), and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901 et seq. (1994). Relevant portions of both Acts are reprinted in Appendix B. A number of the Environmental Protection Agency, ("EPA"), regulations and Army Corps of Engineers,
("Corps"), regulations are relevant to this case. The relevant regulations are also set forth in Appendix B. The Order from the District Court of New Union is set forth in Appendix A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Procedural History
This is an appeal from an order entered on September 1,
2001, by Judge Romulus in the United States District Court for
the District of New Union on Defendant's motion for summary
judgment. The district court dismissed the action initiated by Appellant Birdwatchers of Groveton, Inc. ("BOG") against Appellee
Suave Real Properties, Inc. ("Suave") seeking civil penalties and
injunctive relief under the citizen suit provisions of the CWA and
the RCRA. The district court justified its grant of summary judgment against BOG on four grounds. Regarding Suave's CWA violations, the district court said that BOG's action was precluded
because Congress does not have the power under the Commerce
Clause or Treaty Clause to protect bodies of water like Sheldrake
Pond, and secondly, even if Congress has the power, Congress did
not intend to protect such bodies of water under the CWA. Regarding Suave's RCRA violations, the district court said that lead
shot and skeet parts do not fall under the EPA's regulatory definition or Congress' statutory definition of solid waste.
The district court granted a motion to intervene by the United
States on behalf of the United States EPA. The United States
acts as an Appellant in this case, challenging the district court's
refusal to protect Sheldrake Pond under the CWA and its insistence that lead shot and skeet parts are not solid waste under
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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Congress' statutory definition in RCRA. With respect to the
EPA's regulation, however, the United States supports the district
court's conclusion that lead shot and skeet parts are not solid
waste under that definition. Thus, BOG and the United States
join each other in opposing the district court's ruling on three of
the grounds. BOG, however, also opposes the district court's ruling on the fourth ground. Appellee Suave supports the district
court's judgment in its entirety. (R. at 1-2).
B.

Statement of the Facts

Located in New Union, Sheldrake Pond is a playa lake four
feet deep and twenty-five acres in size during the wet part of the
year. The lake serves as an important habitat for more than 200
species of bird, including a large number of migratory birds that
stop at the Pond during annual interstate and international migrations. Many of the migratory birds, such as Mexican ducks,
jacanas, avocets, sandhill cranes, and warbling vireos, travel as
far as Canada and Mexico in their migrations. Members of BOG,
a non-profit corporation organized in New Union, have traveled to
Sheldrake Pond for over two decades to observe these many species of bird that congregate on Sheldrake Pond or its banks. (R. at
3).
The County of Groveton owns the land to the east and south
of Sheldrake Pond, as well as a portion of the lake itself. Suave
owns the land to the west and south of Sheldrake Pond, and a
portion of the western end of the playa lake. In 2000, Suave filled
a portion of the western end of Sheldrake Pond to build a platform
for a skeet ejection device. Soon thereafter, Suave began managing a skeet shooting operation and recreational firing range near
Sheldrake Pond. As a part of its skeet shooting operation, Suave
ejects skeet over Sheldrake Pond, and shooters attempt to hit the
skeet with lead shot fired from shotguns. As a result, lead shot
and skeet parts continually fall into and around Sheldrake Pond.
Additionally, though a berm has been placed behind the firing
range, lead bullets occasionally overshoot the berm and enter into
Sheldrake Pond. The lead shot, skeet, and lead bullets fall on
both the County-owned and the Suave-owned portions of Sheldrake Pond as well as the adjacent land. Suave does not have an
easement or other agreement with the County allowing Suave to
invade the County's land and portion of the playa lake. (R. at 3-4).
11
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Butler
v. City of PrairieVillage, 172 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). The
facts are to be examined and reasonable inferences drawn in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Butler, 172 F.3d at
745. If there is no genuine issue of material fact, the reviewing
court determines whether the lower court correctly applied the
substantive law. Id.
In evaluating a constitutional challenge to a federal statute, a
court applies a de novo standard of review. United States v. Luna,
165 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999). When reviewing a challenge to
the validity of a congressional exercise of power under the Commerce Clause, a court uses the following standards: "(1) whether a
rational basis exists for finding that the regulated activity affects
interstate commerce, and (2) whether the means chosen by Congress were 'reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution."' Deer Park Indep. School Dist. v. Harris County
AppraisalDist., 132 F.3d 1095, 1098 (5th Cir. 1998). "The burden
for the challenger ...

is high." Id.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to Suave Real Properties, Inc. on all four issues
and remand this case for further proceedings on the merits.
First, Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate intrastate activities that affect interstate commerce, and
the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to enact any
laws necessary to achieve that end. Regulation of Suave is appropriate because the pollution of Sheldrake Pond is an economic activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce by destroying the habitat of over 200 species of bird and
disrupting the ability of numerous birdwatchers to observe the
birds in their natural environment. Additionally, the Clean Water
Act ("CWA") is a valid means under the Necessary and Proper
Clause of effectuating the migratory bird treaties between the
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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United States and Canada and Mexico, treaties that have been
ratified by the Senate pursuant to the Constitution.
Second, Sheldrake Pond is a "navigable water" under the
CWA. The Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") interpretation of "navigable waters" explicitly includes playa lakes, the use,
degradation, or destruction of which affects interstate commerce.
Congress charged the EPA with interpreting and implementing
the CWA, and the EPA's interpretation is consistent with both
congressional intent and the broad interpretation of the reaches of
the CWA given by courts. Congress has further bolstered the
EPA's definition by adopting it verbatim in a recent amendment.
The amendment governs this case because it was a curative measure brought in direct response to a recent United States Supreme
Court case. Finally, the congressional amendment makes clear
that Sheldrake Pond is protected by the CWA not only because it
is a playa lake, the destruction of which affects interstate commerce, but also because Sheldrake Pond is an important habitat
for migratory birds.
Third, the district court erred in holding that lead shot and
skeet parts are not "solid waste" under the regulatory definition,
which is the EPA's interpretation of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). The lower court misapplied deference
to the EPA's interpretation of the regulatory language and incorrectly interpreted the "consumer use" exemption when applying it
to the regulatory definition of "solid waste."
Fourth, the district court erred in holding that lead shot and
skeet parts are not "solid waste" under the statutory definition
found in RCRA. The lower court erroneously attempted to extend
the "consumer use" exemption to the statutory definition of "solid
waste." The extension of the "consumer use" exemption would not
only lead to absurd results, but also would undermine the purpose
of RCRA.

13
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ARGUMENT
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF WATER POLLUTION IN
SHELDRAKE POND IS JUSTIFIED BY THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE TREATY
CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
A.

Congress' Authority under the Commerce Clause and Its
Jurisdictional Reach under the Clean Water Act Are

Broad
The Constitution of the United States grants Congress the
power "[t]o regulate Commerce .

.

. among the several States."

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. As Chief Justice Marshall stated
nearly 200 years ago, the power to regulate commerce, "like all
others vested in [Clongress, is complete in itself, may be exercised
to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than
are prescribed in the [C]onstitution." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,
196 (1824). The power is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states: "It extends to those activities intrastate
which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of
Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means
to the attainment of a legitimate end." United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941). Together with its power to regulate the
nation's commerce, Congress may enact laws that it deems 'necessary and proper' to achieve that end. Groome Resources Ltd. v.
Parishof Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 202 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
The Clean Water Act ("CWA" or "Act") prohibits the discharge, without a permit, of pollutants into "navigable waters."
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12)(A) (1994). Within the Act, "navigable waters" is further defined as "the waters of the United States."
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994). "IT]he Supreme Court has indicated
that in defining 'navigable waters' as 'waters of the United States,'
Congress intended 'to exercise its powers under the Commerce
Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed
"navigable" under the classical understanding of that term."'
United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133
(1985)). Thus, "the power of Congress to regulate the discharge of
pollutaxits into at least some nonnavigable waters is indisputable
.... " Wilson, 133 F.3d at 251; United States v. Holland, 373 F.
Supp. 665, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (holding "Congress is not limited
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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by the 'navigable waters' test in its authority to control pollution
under the Commerce Clause"). This is in keeping with Congress'
intent to exercise its full powers under the Commerce Clause.
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133 (citing S. Conf. Rep.
No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972); 118 Cong. Rec. 33756-57 (1972) (statement of Rep. Dingell)); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d
354, 357 (9th Cir. 1990).
B.

Under the Power Granted by the Commerce Clause, the
Jurisdictional Reach of the CWA Extends to Sheldrake

Pond
There are "three broad categories of activity that Congress
may regulate under its commerce power."' United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000) (quoting United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)). First, Congress may regulate the use of
the channels of interstate commerce, and second, Congress has
the authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609. Though BOG argued at the district court level that these two categories apply in
this case, (Birdwatchersof Groveton, Inc. v. United States, Civ.
No. 01-878, at 7 (D.N.U. 2001) ("R.")), BOG concedes that the activity at question is neither a "channel" nor an "instrumentality"
of interstate commerce for purposes of this appeal. See, e.g., Gibbs
v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 490-91 (4th Cir. 2000) (regulation limiting the taking of red wolves on private land is not a regulation of
channels or things); United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 734
(3d Cir. 1993) (regulation of pollution of wetlands "adjacent" to
navigable waters is not a regulation of channel or instrumentality); Rancho Viejo v. Norton, No. CIV.A.1:00CV02798, 2001 WL
1223502, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2001) (regulation of housing development under Endangered Species Act is not a regulation of
channel or instrumentality).
It is the third category of permissible regulation that encompasses this case: "those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609. Within this category
are activities that "arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce." Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491 (quoting Lopez, 514
U.S. at 561). The pollution of Sheldrake Pond by Suave is just
such an economic activity. Suave's discharge of fill material, skeet
and lead substantially affects interstate commerce by destroying
the habitat of over 200 species of bird and disrupting the ability of
15
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numerous birdwatchers to observe the birds in their natural environment, particularly when such pollution is viewed in the aggregate. For this reason, the regulation of Suave falls within the
powers of Congress as granted under the Commerce Clause. See
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61 (discussing cases upholding regulation
of intrastate economic activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce); see also Wilson, 133 F.3d at
256 ("Congress can clearly regulate discharges of pollutants that
substantially affect interstate commerce.")
1. Regulation of Sheldrake Pond Satisfies the Four Factors
Set Forth in United States v. Morrison
a.

The Pollution of Sheldrake Pond is an Economic
Activity

In Morrison, the Supreme Court enumerated four factors that
help to determine whether an activity falls within the third category of activities Congress may regulate. 529 U.S. at 609-12. The
first factor a court examines is whether "the activity in question
[is] some sort of economic endeavor." Id. at 610. In answering
this question, lower courts have been unanimous in finding that
the economic nature of an activity must be "understood in broad
terms." Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491 (discussing Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942)); Groome, 234 F.3d at 208; United States v.
Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2000).
In the present case, Suave's discharging of fill material into
Sheldrake Pond is an economic activity no matter how it is perceived. To begin with, Suave, a real estate management company,
filled a portion of Sheldrake Pond in the process of developing
land into a skeet shooting facility and firing range. (R. at 3-4.) As
the court found in Rancho Viejo, the development of land for the
purpose of constructing upon it "is plainly an economic activity."
2001 WL 12223502, at *6. Furthermore, Suave continues to deposit fill material or pollutants into the Pond in the course of operating the facility. (R. at 3-4.) Each skeet ejected into the air and
landing in the Pond generates money for Suave as it simultaneously pollutes the water; thus, the pollution of the water is directly related to an economic endeavor.1 Finally, the discharge of
1. Because the facts are unclear as to whether Suave makes money in the process of its operation, BOG requests that the Court view the available information in a
light most favorable to BOG by inferring that the operation of the facility is for profit.
Butler v. City of PrairieVillage, Kan., 172 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 1999).
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pollutants on a broad scale is an activity economic in nature.
Those persons discharging pollutants usually act in the furtherance of a business purpose and often avoid expensive treatment
processes or the fees associated with disposing materials in a lawful manner. 2 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1994) (directing courts to
consider the economic benefit arising from a violation when determining civil penalties); S. Rep. No. 50, at 25 (1985) ("Violators
should not be able to obtain an economic benefit vis-a-vis their
competitors due to their noncompliance with environmental
laws.").
Regardless of whether they are viewed broadly or narrowly,
Suave's activities are economic and therefore distinguishable from
the non-economic activities that the Supreme Court held could not
be regulated in Lopez and Morrison. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567
(possession of a gun in a local school zone); Morrison, 529 U.S. at
613 (gender-motivated crimes). This distinction is important, for
the Supreme Court has "upheld a wide variety of congressional
Acts regulating intrastate economic activity," Morrison, 529 U.S
at 610, including the regulation of homegrown wheat, which "involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a
school zone does not." Lopez, 514 U.S at 560 (discussing Wickard,
317 U.S. 111).
b.

The Statutory Language Contains a Jurisdictional
Element

The second factor to which a court looks is whether the statutory language at issue "has an express jurisdictional element that
restricts its application to activities that have an explicit connection with interstate commerce." Rancho Viejo, 2001 WL
12223502, at *8 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12). In this case,
the presence of such an element is clear-the statute states: "waters of the U.S. means ... [a]ll other waters ... the use, degradation, or destruction of which would affect or could affect interstate
or foreign commerce . . . . 3 Water Pollution Protection Act of
2. Suave, for example, saves money on the cost of cleaning those materials out of

Sheldrake Pond and the cost of ensuring that those materials do not reach Sheldrake
Pond.
3. It is important at this point to note the disjunctive phrasing of the definition.

BOG is not arguing that the jurisdictional reach of the CWA extends to those waters
the use of which could affect interstate commerce. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 256-57
(holding that Commerce Clause does not support regulation of activity because it may
possibly affect interstate commerce); CargillInc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955, 958
(1995) (J. Thomas, dissenting) (questioning constitutionality of provision requiring
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2001, P.L. 106-720; see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2000). Though a
jurisdictional element is not dispositive and is relevant only in
those cases in which a non-economic activity is being regulated,
Groome, 234 F.3d at 211, the presence of such an element in this
case is but another sign that the regulation of Suave under the
CWA is squarely within Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
c.

Congress Has Found that Water Pollution
Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce

The third factor of Morrison is whether the legislative history
of the act provides insight into the "legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affects interstate commerce
...." 529 U.S. at 612. Prior to answering this question, it is important to note that Congress "is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on
interstate commerce." Id.
Nevertheless, for nearly 30 years,
courts have recognized that "[t]he legislative history of the [Clean
Water] Act is laden with reports, references and statements supporting the widely accepted conclusion that water pollution is a
national problem severely affecting the health of our people, the
welfare of the nation and the efficient conduct of interstate commerce." United States v. Ashland Oil and Trans. Co., 364 F. Supp.
349, 351 (W.D. Ky. 1973) (citing A Legislative History of the
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Vol. 1 & 2, and
Comm. on Public Works, 93d Cong., Serial No. 93-1 (1st Sess.
1973)), affd, 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); see also Holland, 373
F. Supp. at 673 (finding [ilt is beyond question that water pollution has a serious effect on interstate commerce").
In addressing the legislative history component, the district
court made two critical errors. First, it looked to evidence of the
connection between migratory birds and interstate commerce.
(See R. at 7.) The regulated activity in this case, however, is the
discharge of pollutants into water, and it is the general impact of
that activity on interstate commerce that is at issue. 4 See, e.g.,
only that activity "could" affect interstate commerce); but see Hoffman Homes, Inc. v.
EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993) (deferring to an interpretation of CWA that

"indicates the regulation covers waters whose connection to interstate commerce may
be potential rather than actual"). Rather, BOG asserts that the CWA's jurisdiction
extends to Sheldrake Pond because Suave's activities are affecting interstate commerce, not because they could or may.

4. Even if this Court found it necessary to rely upon evidence of the relationship
between migratory birds and interstate commerce, the record is clear that migratory
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Groome, 234 F.3d at 213 (noting sufficient record of the general
effects of housing discrimination on interstate commerce in Fair
Housing Act case). Second, the lower court summarized the Morrison court as rejecting congressional findings on the basis that
"just because Congress said so, does not make it so." (R. at 7.)
However, the precise reason that the Morrison Court refused to
uphold the statute was because the relationship between the activity and interstate commerce was too attenuated, regardless of
the legislative findings. 529 U.S. at 615.
d.

There Is a Direct Link Between the Pollution of
Sheldrake Pond and Interstate Commerce

The final factor set forth in Morrison is an attenuation analysis. See 529 U.S. at 612, 615 (refusing to follow a "but-for causal
chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime ... to every attenuated effect"). In this case, the link between Suave's pollution
of Sheldrake Pond and interstate commerce is direct and does not
require that the Court "pile inference upon inference" to find a
connection. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. The district court dismissed
the relationship because "no human interstate activity has been
alleged at Sheldrake Pond," (R. at 7), but such a distinction misses
the mark. The fact that Appellants are comprised of a group of
intrastate birdwatchers does not mean that the destruction and
pollution of Sheldrake Pond has no effect on interstate commerce.
For at least two decades, BOG's members had observed over 200
species of bird on the Pond, many of which were migratory. 5 (R. at
birds are substantially connected to interstate commerce. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 63 n.19 (1979) (the "assumption that the national commerce power does
not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed"); Cargill, 516 U.S. at 959 (J. Thomas,
dissenting) ("substantial interstate commerce depends on the continued existence of
migratory birds"). The lower court summarily dismissed the Report of the Senate
Environment Committee, P.L. 106-720, (R. at 7), but Lopez states that a court may
look to "congressional committee findings" in its search for legislative judgment of the
effect of an activity on interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. Moreover, a
"court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate
commerce if there is any rational basis for such a finding." Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981). The district court's dismissal
of the Report as not being "real evidence," (R. at 7), overlooks the substantiation of the
Report's findings in other cases. See, e.g., Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 261; Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191
F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing statistics), rev'd on other grounds, 531 U.S. 159
(2001).
5. Cf Cargill, 516 U.S. at 959 (J. Thomas, dissenting) (noting that "there was no
showing that humans ever went to petitioner's property to . . . observe migratory
birds"); Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that
"there was no evidence that any migratory birds actually used" area in question); but
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3). The effect of wildlife observation on commerce is astounding;
for example, in 1980 more than 100 million Americans spent almost $14.8 billion to watch and photograph fish and wildlife. U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Wetlands: Their Use
and Regulation 54 (OTA-O-206, Mar. 1984). That intrastate
birdwatchers contribute to interstate commerce cannot be denied
and for this reason, the effect of Suave's activity on interstate commerce is not attenuated.
But BOG need not prove that Suave has affected interstate
commerce on an individual basis; it need prove only that Suave's
activity, "in the aggregate," substantially affects interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added). In other words,
it is the "class" of regulated activities-not an individual instance-that is to be considered in the "affects" analysis. Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). "[W]here a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de
minimus character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (emphasis and
citation omitted). The aggregate pollution of intrastate water bodies such as Sheldrake Pond, where people congregate to observe
migratory birds, undoubtedly results in a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers ("S WANCC"),
531 U.S. 159, 194-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is undisputed
that literally millions of people regularly participate in birdwatching" and that this activity "generate [s] a host of commercial activities of great value.") Moreover, the CWA is a "complex regulatory
program," which "when considered as a whole satisfies [the Commerce Clause]." Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 497 (quoting Hodel v. Indiana,
452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981)).
The cases upon which the district court rests its decision are
distinguishable from the instant case. (See R. at 6-7.) In both Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court refused to uphold regulations of non-economic activities that did not contain a
jurisdictional element and, at best, were connected to interstate
commerce in only the most tenuous manner. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549;
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. To the contrary, the discharge of pollutants and fill material by Suave meets every factor necessary to
establish Congress' power to regulate such activity under the
see Leslie, 55 F.3d at 1396 (upholding regulation of ponded areas despite lack of
human interaction with migratory birds).
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Commerce Clause. See Morrison, 609-12. Where an economic activity, in the aggregate, "substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained."
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) ("if it is interstate commerce that feels
the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies
the squeeze" (citations omitted)). For these reasons, Congress has
the power to regulate Suave under the Commerce Clause, and the
district court's granting of summary judgment must be reversed.
C.

The CWA Is a Necessary and Proper Means of Effectuating
the Migratory Bird Treaties between the United States
and Canada and Mexico

Congress may enact any law necessary to effectuate a treaty
between the United States and another nation. United States v.
Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920)). The authority to do so arises under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432. The only requirement is that
the treaty be valid under Article II of the Constitution. Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432; U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
The United States has entered into treaties with both Canada
(by way of Great Britain) and Mexico to assure the protection of
birds migrating across North America. See Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. at 431; Alaska Fish and Wildlife Fed. and OutdoorCouncil, Inc. v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 941 (9th Cir. 1987). The United
States Senate ratified each of these treaties pursuant to the
Treaty Clause of the Constitution. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
at 433; United States v. Blanket, 391 F. Supp. 15, 18 (W.D. Okla.
1975). Therefore, the treaties are valid exercises of the Executive's treaty power. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
In its opinion, the district court summarily dismissed the argument that Sheldrake Pond falls within the jurisdiction of the
CWA pursuant to the Treaty Clause. (R. at 7.) Without citing authorities, the district court stated "[a] treaty simply cannot transfer state authority to the federal government" and "there is [no]
indication that Congress was acting pursuant to the Treaty
Clause when it enacted the CWA." Id. While the district court
was correct in stating that a treaty cannot, by itself, transfer state
power to the federal government, see Edwards v. Carter,580 F.2d
1055, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1978), no such argument is being made here.
It is the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution in con21
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junction with the migratory bird treaties, that grants the federal
government the power to regulate Sheldrake Pond. Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
"If [a] treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity
of [a] statute under Article I, Section 8, as a necessary and proper
means to execute the powers of the Government." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432. Contrary to the district court's opinion,
Congress need not have acted solely in pursuance to the treaties
in order for the CWA to reach Sheldrake Pond. So long as "the
effectuating legislation bear[s] a rational relationship to a permissible constitutional end," it satisfies the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Lue, 134 F.3d at 84.
Here, the CWA was enacted, inter alia, for the purpose of providing "for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and
wildlife." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1994). According to the Ninth
Circuit, the Act may be "plausibly" read to provide for the protection of migratory birds, Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d
1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1995), and the protection of migratory birds is
a key aspect of the treaties. Dunckle, 829 F.2d at 941. Moreover,
the Report of the Senate Environment Committee accompanying
Congress' recent amendment to the CWA, P.L. 106-720, states
that Congress "intended... to cover... waters that are important
stopovers for migratory birds." S. Rep. No. 106-528, at 23 (2001).
Providing an essential habitat for over 200 species of bird, Sheldrake Pond is such a body of water. (R. at 3.) Therefore, its regulation under the CWA is authorized as a necessary and proper
means to the effectuation of the migratory bird treaties between
the United States and Canada and Mexico.
II.

SHELDRAKE POND IS NAVIGABLE WATER UNDER
THE CWA

Sheldrake Pond falls within the CWA's definition of "navigable waters" for three reasons, any of which is sufficient to support
jurisdiction. First, the use, degredation, and destruction of Sheldrake Pond affects interstate commerce, and such bodies of water
are included within the EPA's interpretation of "navigable waters." Second, if there was any doubt as to whether Congress intended to include such bodies of water under the CWA, the doubt
ended when Congress adopted the EPA's interpretation of "navigable waters" in a recent congressional amendment. Finally,
Sheldrake Pond is an important habitat for migratory birds and
under Congress' recent amendment, such bodies of water are also
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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covered under the CWA. Therefore, because Sheldrake Pond is a
navigable water under the CWA, this Court should reverse the
holding of the district court.
A. Sheldrake Pond Is a Body of Water, the Use, Degradation,
or Destruction of Which Affects Interstate Commerce
Congress' express purpose in enacting the CWA was to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). To accomplish
this purpose, Congress used the broad term "navigable waters" in
defining the reach of the CWA, intending to exercise its full authority under the Commerce Clause. S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3822. The district
court recognized this clear congressional intent (R. at 4), as have
other courts. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that
Congress intended the definition of navigable waters under the
Act to reach to the full extent permissible under the Constitution .... This broad definition makes it clear that the term 'navigable' as used in the Act is of limited import and that with the
CWA Congress chose to regulate waters that would not be
deemed navigable under the classical understanding of that
term.
United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 899
(1997).
The Supreme Court has noted it is a "water body's capability
of use by the public for purposes of transportation or commerce"
that is the determinative factor in resolving whether the water
body falls within the CWA. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159,
168 (2001) ("SWANCC") (citing 33 CFR § 209.260(e)(1) (1974)).
Similarly, the Supreme Court has unanimously agreed that even
though Congress used the term "navigable water" in the CWA, the
term "navigable" is of limited import. United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985). The Riverside
Bayview Homes Court noted the breadth of the federal regulation
contemplated by the CWA and Congress' intent to repudiate limits
that had been placed on federal regulation under previous statutes. Id.
Congress granted the EPA authority to implement and interpret the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1994); see also SWANCC, 531
23
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U.S. at 184 n.10. The EPA interprets the term "navigable water,"
as used in the CWA, to include playa lakes "the use, degradation,
or destruction of which would affect or could affect interstate or
foreign commerce. .. ." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2001). Sheldrake Pond
falls squarely within the EPA's definition of a playa lake, the use,
degradation, or destruction of which affects interstate commerce,
and is thus "navigable water" under the CWA. To be sure, it is not
the presence of birds themselves that makes Sheldrake Pond
"navigable water" under the CWA but rather the effect Sauve's activities have had on the many intrastate birdwatchers who visited
the Pond. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2001).
Suave's allegation that Sheldrake Pond does not affect commerce because BOG's members are intrastate birdwatchers
misses the mark. (See R. at 5.) The question, for the purposes of
the Commerce Clause is not whether this single activity affects
commerce; the question is whether the activity that Congress is
attempting to regulate affects interstate commerce in the aggregate. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also Perez, 402 U.S. at 154. As
the Supreme Court noted in SWANCC, millions of people spend
over a billion dollars annually on recreational pursuits relating to
migratory birds. 531 U.S. at 173. The use, degradation, and destruction of playa lakes like Sheldrake Pond, in the aggregate, affects interstate commerce because the millions of birdwatchers
who spend billions of dollars will be detrimentally affected if such
activities went unregulated. Accordingly, Suave's allegation that
BOG's members are intrastate and therefore do not affect inter6
state commerce is without merit.
B.

The SWANCC Decision Does Not Affect the Conclusion that
Sheldrake Pond Is a Navigable Water for Purposes of the
Clean Water Act

The district court's erroneous conclusion that Sheldrake Pond
was not navigable water under the CWA rested primarily on the
recent SWANCC decision. (R. at 5-6.) The SWANCC decision is
6. The fact that Suave disputes that Sheldrake Pond is a playa lake, and instead
is a vernal pool, either works against Suave or is irrelevant. (See R. at 5.) First, it is
inappropriate to settle factual disputes at summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
If Suave seriously contends Sheldrake Pond is not a playa lake, the contention is a
factual dispute that should be settled at trial and not on a motion for summary judgment. See id. Second, for the purposes of summary judgment facts are to be construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). Accordingly, Sheldrake Pond should be construed to
be a playa lake as BOG has alleged and the district court has found. (R. at 5.)
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not controlling for the case at hand for three reasons. First,
SWANCC was dealing with a different law. Second, SWANCC
was dealing with a different set of facts. Finally, SWANCC made
very clear that the holding was limited to the particular facts of
the case and specifically did not over-rule any statutes or previous
case law.
1.

SWANCC was Dealing with a Different Law

In SWANCC, the Supreme Court was dealing with the "Migratory Bird Rule," a regulation promulgated by the Army Corps
of Engineers ("Corps") in an attempt to clarify the Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA. 531 U.S. at 164. The "Migratory Bird Rule"
states that the CWA covers any intrastate water that could be
used by migrating birds. 51 Fed. Reg. 41206 (1986). Thus, under
the Corps' regulation, the presence of migratory birds is sufficient
to make water subject to the jurisdiction of the CWA. Id. The
SWANCC Court, however, disagreed: "We hold that 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3)(1999), as clarified and applied to petitioner's balefill
site pursuant to the 'Migratory Bird Rule,' 51 Fed. Reg. [412061
(1986), exceeds the authority granted to respondents under [33
U.S.C. § 1344(a)]." 531 U.S. at 174.
In the case at hand Sheldrake Pond is navigable water under
the CWA not because of the "Migratory Bird Rule," at question in
SWANCC. Rather, Sheldrake Pond is navigable water under the
CWA because Sheldrake Pond is a playa lake, the use, degradation, or destruction of which affects interstate commerce. This is
critically distinct from the "Migratory Bird Rule." In SWANCC,
the Court held that Congress did not intend for the mere presence
of migratory birds to be sufficient to make water navigable for
purposes of the CWA. 531 U.S. at 171-72. While the presence of
migratory birds did not cut it in SWANCC, it is not just the presence of migratory birds but the use of Sheldrake Pond by recreational birdwatchers that, in the aggregate, affects interstate
commerce in this case. As such, Sheldrake Pond fits the definition
of "navigable water" under the EPA's regulation, which was not at
question in SWANCC.
In SWANCC the Corps also attempted to argue that there
was a substantial effect on interstate commerce, but it was unclear what the activity was that the Corps was claiming affected
interstate commerce. 531 U.S. at 173. The Corps changed their
argument midstream, focusing on the commercial nature of a municipal landfill instead of the recreational travelers and
25
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birdwatchers. Id. In response, the Court spent only six sentences
dealing with the Corps' contention, stating that the argument
raised significant constitutional questions and that the Court
would have to evaluate the precise object or activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. Accordingly, little can be
said of the SWANCC decision regarding the EPA statute, which
defines a playa lake, like Sheldrake Pond, as "navigable water" for
purposes of the CWA if the destruction of that water affects interstate commerce.
2.

The Facts of SWANCC are Different from the Facts of
this Case

Not only was SWANCC dealing with a different law, it was
dealing with a different set of facts. In SWANCC, a municipality
attempted to develop a 533-acre abandoned sand and gravel pit
mining operation as a disposal site for baled, nonhazardous solid
waste. 531 U.S. at 163. However, after the sand and gravel pit
mining operation was abandoned, a number of permanent and
seasonal ponds developed where mining depressions collected
water. Id. The ponds ranged in size from under one tenth of an
acre to several acres, and from several inches to several feet deep,
and several migratory birds gathered at the ponds. Id.
The facts of this case are much different. Sheldrake Pond is
not an abandoned gravel and sand mining pit, it is a playa lake.
(R. at 5.) Note that playa lakes like Sheldrake Pond are explicitly
included in both the EPA's and the Corps' definitions of navigable
water under the CWA, while abandoned sand and gravel mining
pits are not. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2001); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(3) (2001).
Also, Sheldrake Pond is a more substantial body of water than the
sand and gravel mining pits discussed in SWANCC. Sheldrake
Pond is twenty-five acres in size and four feet deep during the wet
season. (R. at 3.) The largest of the abandoned gravel pits in
SWANCC was "several acres" and "several feet deep." 531 U.S. at
163.
Most importantly, in SWANCC there was no showing that
birdwatchers were observing the migratory birds at the ponds.
531 U.S. at 173. Accordingly, the SWANCC Court could not evaluate the specific activity's impact, in the aggregate, on interstate
commerce. Id. Here, it is undisputed that the members of BOG
have been traveling to Sheldrake Pond for over two decades to
view the large variety of bird species that visit Sheldrake Pond.
This is the precise activity that the Corps failed to make clear in
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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SWANCC, which led the Court to say it could not reach the constitutional issues. 531 U.S. at 173. In this case, the activity affecting interstate commerce is clear and undisputed.
3.

The Holding of SWANCC Is Limited

The SWANCC Court made clear that the holding in that case
was limited, stating "[w]e hold that 33 CFR § 328(a)(3)(1999), as
clarified and applied to petitioner's balefill site . . . exceeds the
authority granted to [the Corps] under.., the CWA." 531 U.S. at
174 (emphasis added). The Court in SWANCC did not over-rule
the statute in question as unconstitutional. Id. Nor did they overrule any of the decades' worth of case law broadly interpreting the
scope of the CWA. Id. The Court did comment on its landmark
decision in Riverside Bayview Homes but distinguished that case
from the issue in SWANCC and left Riverside Bayview Homes intact. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 170-72. Likewise, the SWANCC
Court made no mention of over-ruling InternationalPaper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481(1987), a case where the Court upheld the
EPA's broad definition of navigable waters as including almost
any body of surface water that might affect interstate commerce.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 486 n.6. Instead, the SWANCC Court chose
to explicitly hold that the statute at question, applied to those particular facts, did not fall within the CWA. 531 U.S. at 174.
Case law and administrative interpretations since SWANCC
have noted that the Supreme Court's holding was narrow. For example, in United States v. Interstate General Co., 152 F.Supp.2d
843 (D. Md. 2001), the court said, "The SWANCC case is a narrow
holding .... Because the Supreme Court only reviewed 33 CFR
§ 328.3(a)(3), it would be improper for this Court to extend the
SWANCC Court's ruling any farther than they clearly intended." 7
In a memorandum addressing and explaining the impact of the
7. See also Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136 F.Supp.2d 81,119 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
noting the continued validity of the EPA statute, 40 CFR 122.2, which is identical to
the statute in question in SWANCC, and noting the continued breadth of navigable
waters under decisional law; see also United States v. Krilich, 152 F. Supp. 2d 983,
988 (N.D. Ill. 2001). In Krilich, the court pointed out that SWANCC "does not clarify"
what nonnavigable bodies of water fall within the CWA definition of navigable waters,
except to make clear that migratory birds alone are insufficient. 152 F. Supp. 2d at
988. The court also noted that "[clases subsequent to SWANCC have not limited the
definition of waters of the United States to those immediately adjacent to navigable
(in the traditional sense) waters." Id. at 992 n.13; see also Rancho Viejo v. Norton, No.
CIV.A.1:00CV02798, 2001 WL 1223502, at *9 (D.D.C. 2001) (stating that the
SWANCC holding was limited to the specific application of the "Migratory Bird
Rule").
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SWANCC decision, General Counsel for the EPA and the Corps
also noted the narrowness of the SWANCC decision: "Although
the Court held that the Corps' application of § 328.3(a)(3) was invalid in SWANCC, the Court did not strike down §328.3(a)(3) or
any other component of the regulations defining 'waters of the
United States' .... [Tihe Court's actual holding was narrowly limited .

. . ."

Environmental Protection Agency, United States De-

partment of Army, Memorandum of General Counsel (January 19,
2001). Also worth mention is the fact that the Corps has not
changed the regulation called into question in SWANCC. See 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2001). Nor has the EPA changed its identical
provision. See 40 C.F.R. 122.2 (2001); see also Krilich, 152 F.
Supp. 2d at 988 n.5 ("[n]o final or proposed regulation has been
found which revises the regulatory definitions in light of
SWANCC").
In sum, because the SWANCC Court was dealing with a different law, different set of facts, and a carefully expressed narrow
holding, the District Court erred in concluding that SWANCC was
applicable to the case at hand. Thus, this Court should reverse
the district court.
C.

Congress' Recent Amendment Adopting the EPA's
Definition of Which Waters are Covered by the CWA,
Makes Clear that Bodies of Water Like Sheldrake Pond
Fall Under the CWA

On August 15, 2001, Congress amended the CWA's definition
of "navigable waters" to incorporate the EPA's definition of "waters of the United States." Water Pollution Protection Act Amendments of 2001, P.L. 106-720. If there was any doubt whether
Congress intended to include bodies of water such as Sheldrake
Pond under the CWA, the amendment sets those doubts to rest.
Because Sheldrake Pond is a playa lake, the use, degradation, or
destruction of which affects interstate commerce, it is a navigable
water under the CWA's new definition. However, the lower court
dismissed the amendment as inapplicable to this case because
BOG's complaint was filed prior to the amendment. (R. at 6.) Citing no authority, the district court stated that it is commonplace
statutory interpretation that unless a statute explicitly directs
retrospective application, the statute in place at the filing of the
complaint governs. Id. The district court is in error.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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Congress' 2001 Amendment to the CWA is a Curative
Statute and Therefore the Amendment Applies to the
Case at Hand

Critical examination of relevant authority reveals that because the 2001 amendment is a curative statute, the amendment
governs even though it was enacted after the complaint was filed.
Curative statutes are measures that either "ratify prior official
conduct or make a remedial adjustment in an administrative
scheme." Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Newark, Treatise on
Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, § 15.9 (3d ed.
1999). A court will almost always sustain retroactive legislation
when it is curative. Id.; see also Federal HousingAdmin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958); Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946); Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508
U.S. 10 (1993).
In Darlington, for example, the Supreme Court examined an
amendment similar to the one at question here. 358 U.S. 84.
There Congress had enacted the Veterans Emergency Housing
Act, a law authorizing the Federal Housing Authority to ensure
veterans of World War II would have housing. Id. at 85. The FHA
established a policy that housing under the program must be residential, and could not include transient housing. Id. In 1954 Congress adopted the FHA's policy into law as an amendment to the
original act. Id. The plaintiff in the Darlington case maintained
an apartment building that included some rentals for transients.
Id. at 87. When Congress adopted the 1954 amendment, the
plaintiff sought declaratory relief, arguing that the amendment
would be unconstitutional if applied to his building because the
amendment would apply retrospectively in violation of due process of law. Id. The Court disagreed, noting that "Congress by the
1954 Act was doing no more than protecting the regulatory system
which it had designed. Those who do business in the regulated
field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end." Id. at 91 (citing Viex v. Sixth Ward Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940); Keefe v. Clark,
322 U.S. 393 (1944)).
The Court's willingness to uphold curative statutes is explained by a number of factors. Curative statutes are often legislative responses to previous court decisions overruling specific
administrative action. Rotunda, Treatise on Constitutional Law:
Substance and Procedure, § 15.9; see also Anderson v. Mount
Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). When this happens, the
29
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legislature is merely responding to a judicial suggestion to eliminate a defect in statutory law and the curative legislation just corrects the flaw. Rotunda, Treatise on Constitutional Law:
Substance and Procedure, § 15.9. Additionally, curative statutes
aid to ensure full effect is given to the original intent of the initial
legislation. Id. Congress' 2001 Amendment to the CWA is curative because it was in direct response the Supreme Court's judicial
determination in SWANCC. In SWANCC, the Court said that
Congress did not intend to give the Corps the power asserted
under the "Migratory Bird Rule." 531 U.S. at 174. The Report of
the Senate Environment Committee ("Report") accompanying the
amendment explains that the "Supreme Court's opinion... misinterpreted congressional intent ....
We intended the [CWAI to
cover isolated waters that are important stopovers for migratory
birds." S. Rep. No. 106-528, at 23 (2001).
The lower court nonetheless dismissed the statute as not applicable, stating the amendment does not embody retroactivity.
(R. at 6.) However, the amendment does embody retroactivity because Congress amended its definition of navigable waters to clarify the congressional intent behind the CWA. S. Rep. No. 106-528,
at 23 (2001). Congress' definition in the CWA of navigable waters
stood untouched for nearly three decades, in face of judicial decisions and administrative interpretations broadly construing the
congressional intent behind navigable waters to exercise Congress' full power under the Commerce Clause. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)
(1994). Then, the Supreme Court in SWANCC held that Congress
did not intend to extend their power under the Commerce Clause
as broadly as the Corps had said. 531 U.S. at 174. Shortly thereafter, Congress adopted the EPA's broad definition of navigable
waters, which is identical to the provision at issue in SWANCC
and which broadly defines navigable water. Compare 40 C.F.R.
122.2 (2001) with 33 C.F.R. 328.3 (2001).
The district court evidently believes that all of this is coincidental and evidences nothing. However, the legislative history behind the 2001 amendment clears up any uncertainty about what
Congress intended. The Senate Environment Committee made
clear that the purpose of the amendment was to clarify the congressional intent questioned in the SWANCC opinion, stating that
Congress' intent has always been to have the CWA reach the very
waters with which the Court in SWANCC was dealing. S. Rep.
No. 106-528, at 23 (2001). Nevertheless, the district court contends that because the Conference Committee Report and the
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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House Committee Report were both silent on the issue, the
amendment does not apply retroactively. (R. at 6.) The silence of.
the two committee's, however, evidences nothing-that is, their silence should not be construed to be in favor of retroactivity, nor
against it. See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (Souter,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("the legislative history is neutral, for it is silent on this issue").
Finally, the district court asserts "the views of a later Congress are of no help in ascertaining the intent of the earlier congress." (R. at 6.) The Supreme Court disagrees, making clear that
"[s]ubsequent legislation which declares the intent of an earlier
law... is entitled to weight when it comes to the problem of construction." See Darlington,358 U.S. at 90 (citing United States v.
Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477, 480 (1923); Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316
U.S. 317, 329-30 (1942)). Giving weight to Congress' recent
amendment of the CWA means acknowledging that Congress was
merely clarifying its intent behind the CWA and responding to the
SWANCC decision. In short, the timing of Congress' recent
amendment, the legislative history of the amendment, and the intent of the amendment all make clear that the amendment is a
curative statute in response the Court's ruling in SWANCC. Because the amendment is curative, it applies to the case at hand.
D.

Congress' Recent Amendment also Makes Clear that
Because Sheldrake Pond Is an Important Habitat for
Migratory Birds, Sheldrake Pond Falls Under the CWA

The amended statute § 1362(7) also extends the jurisdiction of
the CWA over Sheldrake Pond because of the "Migratory Bird
Rule." The SWANCC Court said that Congress did not intend to
cover isolated, intrastate non-navigable waters under the CWA
solely on the basis of the presence of migratory birds. 531 U.S. at
171-72. But Congress responded to SWANCC with the 2001
Amendment to 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), making clear that Congress
intended to cover such waters under the CWA. S. Rep. No. 106528, at 23 (2001). The Report evidences this intent, as does the
fact that Congress adopted a definition of "navigable waters" identical to the one at question in SWANCC. Id.; compare 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.2 (2001) with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2001).
Any doubt to whether Congress intended to include isolated,
intrastate non-navigable waters under the CWA solely on the basis of migratory birds ended with the Congressional amendment
to 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). When Congress amended the CWA to in31
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clude the EPA's definition of waters of the United States, Congress was presumptively aware of the administrative
determinations interpreting the statute. See Lindahl v. Office of
PersonnelManagement, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985). The Corp's
statute, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3, is identical to the EPA's statute, 40
C.F.R. § 122.2. Moreover, the "Migratory Bird Rule" itself states
"the EPA has clarified" that the CWA covers waters which are or
could be used as habitats for migratory birds. 51 Fed. Reg. 41206
(1986). Congress specifically chose to adopt the EPA's definition
of which waters are covered by the CWA. P.L. 106-720. To conclude that Congress adopted the EPA's definition of those waters,
but not the EPA's clarification and application of that definition
would be illogical and contrary to Supreme Court precedent. See,
e.g., Lindahl, 470 U.S. at 782 n.15. The legislative intent behind
the amendment dispels any question as to whether Congress
meant to extend the CWA to waters that are or could be habitats
for migratory birds. The Committee report makes clear Congress
intended with the Amendment to 1362(7) to include waters used
by migratory birds. S. Rep. No. 106-528, at 23 (2001). The Report
states, "[w] e intended the terms [of the CWAI to cover isolated waters that are important stopovers for migratory birds." S. Rep. No.
106-528, at 23 (2001).
Over 200 species of birds have been observed at Sheldrake
Pond over the past two decades by members of BOG. (R. at 3.)
Many of those species are migratory birds that migrate between
the United States and Canada and/or Mexico, including Mexican
ducks, jacanas, avocets, sandhill cranes, and warbling vireos. Id.
Sheldrake Pond is an important stopover for many birds during
the birds annual interstate and international migration. Id. Accordingly, Sheldrake Pond falls within the definition of navigable
waters under 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) of the CWA.
For all of these reasons, this Court should reverse the holding
of the district court and hold that Sheldrake Pond is navigable
water under the CWA.
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THE REGULATORY AND STATUTORY
DEFINITIONS OF "SOLID WASTE" IN THE
RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY
ACT APPLY TO THE LEAD SHOT AND
SKEET PARTS FALLING INTO AND
ACCUMULATING IN AND ABOUT SHELDRAKE
POND

BOG has asserted two causes of action under the citizen suits
provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq. (1994). (R. at 8.) The first is
based on Suave's failure to obtain a permit for the disposal of solid
waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (1994). The second is based on
Suave's unlawful disposal of solid waste that imminently and substantially endangers human health and the environment. 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1994).
Important to both causes of action is the definition of "solid
waste." Unfortunately, however, there is an alleged dichotomy in
how "solid waste" is defined under RCRA because the EPA's regulatory definition is slightly different from the statutory definition.
See Connecticut Coastal Fishermen'sAss'n v. Remington Arms Co.,
989 F.2d 1305, 1314 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Conn. Coastal"). These two
definitions of solid waste are at issue in the present case because
each cause of action alleged by BOG necessarily involves a different classification of solid waste. (R. at 8.) The definition used
when enforcing violations of permit requirements, the first cause
of action, is a regulatory definition outlined in 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.1(b)(1) (2001). The statutory definition, on the other hand,
is used when prohibiting an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment, which is BOG's second cause
of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1994). According to the EPA,
the regulatory definition of solid waste is narrower than the statutory counterpart. Conn. Coastal, 989 F.2d at 1314.
The district court held that both the regulatory and the statutory definitions of solid waste do not apply in the present case because of the "consumer use exemption." (R. at 11.) However, this
holding is in error. Because both definitions apply to the case at
hand and the exemption does not, the district court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed.
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A. Lead Shot and Skeet Parts That Fall Into and Accumulate
In and Around Sheldrake Pond are "Solid Waste" Under
the Regulatory Definition Because They are Discarded
Materials That Have Been Disposed 0
1. In the Operation of Its Skeet Shooting Facility, Suave is
Both Discarding and Abandoning Skeet and Lead
Shot
The regulatory definition of "solid waste" is "any discarded
material," and "discarded material" is further defined as any material that has been "[albandoned." 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(1) and
(a)(2)(i) (2001). The EPA has opined that "the element of 'abandonment' in the regulatory definition of solid waste renders that
definition somewhat narrower than the statutory definition,"
which "encompasses 'discarded material' without requiring that
the material have been abandoned." Military Toxics Project v.
EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1998). However, the EPA has
never provided a reasonable analysis for such an interpretation.
In reading regulations, courts "start with the assumption that the
legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used." Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962). The
ordinary meanings of "abandoned" and "discarded" are essentially
synonymous. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 43, 360
(1988). Thus, the EPA's interpretation of its own regulation is illogical. Nevertheless, even under the EPA's narrow definition,
Suave is violating RCRA by discarding solid waste without a
permit.
Suave operates a skeet shooting operation in which skeet is
ejected over the Pond and shooters fire at the skeet with shotguns
containing lead shot. Whether the shooters hit or miss, skeet
parts and lead shot fall into and around Sheldrake Pond. (R. at 34.) Therefore, the skeet shooters are discardingmaterial,namely
the lead shot and the skeet. These materials are being abandoned
because the shooters do not choose to retrieve the materials after
shooting. For these reasons, Suave is disposing "solid waste" as it
is defined by the EPA's regulation.
2. The "Consumer Use Exemption" Does Not Apply to the
Definition of Solid Waste
The EPA argues that "consumer products used for their intended purpose" are exempt from the definition of "solid waste."
This argument may have merit with respect to specific exemptions
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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outlined in the regulations, such as pesticides and fertilizers,
where the intended use involves the application of the products to
the land because the products perform a function after being applied to the ground. See 40 C.F.R. § 262(2)(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2001).
However, "[a]s a matter of policy, if all products used for their
'original intended purpose' were exempted from regulation, RCRA
would be without teeth, since virtually all waste could fit within
this loophole." Connecticut Coastal Fisherman'sAss'n v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 173, 188 (D. Conn. 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 989 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1993). Congress alluded to
this possible loophole twenty-five years ago: "It is not only the
waste by-products of the nation's manufacturing processes with
which the committee is concerned: but also the products themselves once they have served their intended purposes and are no
longer wanted by the consumer." 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6240 (emphasis added). It is in accord with the purpose of RCRA to regulate the disposal of hazardous consumer products so that there is
accountability for the materials once they are discarded and pose
a danger to public health and the environment.
In an attempt to extend the consumer use exemption to this
case, both the district court and the EPA analogize the exemption
with the "military munitions rule," which states that military
munitions that land on a firing range are not solid waste. 40
C.F.R. §§ 261.2(a)(2)(iv) and 266.202 (2001). However, this analogy is without merit. First, the rule states that military munitions are not regulatory solid waste when being used for "training,
research, testing, and recovery, [and] collection . . ." 40 C.F.R.
§ 266.202(a)(1)(iii) (2001) (emphasis added). The activities of recovery and collection do not occur in skeet shooting operationsthat is, the skeet shooters never intend to recover or collect the
skeet and lead shot. Second, there is no codified consumer use
exemption pertaining to non-military firing ranges or skeet shooting operations.
Moreover, under Suave's interpretation of the regulatory definition of solid waste, any discarded hazardous material would not
fall under the definition of solid waste if at some point it had been
used for the purpose for which it was intended. This interpretation would lead to an exemption of the majority of consumer
goods. For example, Suave argues that "[lead] shot, like a golf
ball, is not discarded when it is fired and falls to the ground, for
that is its intended use." (R. at 8.) This analogy, however, is fallacious. When people hit golf balls, they do not intend to discard
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them or dispose of them. Rather, they intend to pick up the golf
ball and hit it again.
Despite all of this, the district court deferred to the EPA's interpretation under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NationalResources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). (R. at 9.) Chevron deference
was inappropriate, however, because the EPA has not promulgated a "regulation" pertaining to the use of consumer goods for
their intended purpose. Rather, the EPA has produced policy documents outlining their interpretation. "[Cllassification rulings
are best treated like 'interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines.' They are
beyond the Chevron pale." United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218,
-, 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2175 (2001) (citing Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). While EPA policy documents
are not entitled to Chevron deference, they may be accorded some
deference and in order to determine what degree of respect a policy document is entitled, the Supreme Court set out a three-prong
test. Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2172 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). First, a court asks how formal was the process in which the EPA made the interpretation? Id. Second, a
court looks to how consistent the EPA has been in its interpretation? Id. Third, a court looks to the persuasiveness of the EPA's
interpretation? Id.
In applying this test to the case at hand, the EPA did not develop its interpretation of the consumer use exemption in any formal process. (R. at 10.) Moreover, the EPA's interpretation of the
consumer exemption has been inconsistent. The lower court
found, the "EPA's interpretation of 'discarded,' the key word and
concept in both definitions, has been inconsistent even in its interpretation for purposes of the regulatory definition. (R. at 10) (citing cases). Finally, the EPA's interpretation is unpersuasive. For
these reasons, the district court erred in granting deference to the
EPA's consumer use exemption.
3.

Because Skeet and Lead Shot Fall within the
Regulatory Definition of Hazardous Waste, Suave Is
Violating RCRA by Not Having a Permit to Dispose
of Those Materials

Within RCRA, Congress isolated hazardous waste for more
stringent regulatory treatment than other solid waste.
"[Riecognizing the serious responsibility that such regulations impose, Congress required that hazardous waste-a subset of solid
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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waste as defined in the RCRA regulations-be clearly identified."
Conn. Coastal, 989 F.2d at 1315. Waste meeting the narrower
regulatory definition of solid waste can be a hazardous waste if it
is specifically listed or if it exhibits characteristics such as
ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, or toxicity. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.3(c) and (d) (2001). A person disposing of waste that meets
the "hazardous" definition may lawfully do so only with a permit.
42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1994).
A solid waste is hazardous if, using appropriate testing methods, an "extract from a representative sample of the waste contains any of the contaminants listed in Table 1 [of the regulation]
at the concentration equal to or greater than" that specified. 40
C.F.R. § 261.24(a) (2001). For lead, the concentration threshold is
5.0 mg/L. Id. In Conn. Coastal, the court held that the lead concentration from spent lead shot that was discharged at a skeet
shooting range into Long Island Sound was of sufficient toxicity to
be classified as a hazardous solid waste. 989 F.2d at 1317. That
court also held that the clay parts from skeet might also meet the
threshold for toxicity, but the tests had not been completed. Id.
While the concentration levels of lead and skeet may be different in Sheldrake Pond, it is undisputed that spent lead shot and
clay parts have fallen into and around Sheldrake Pond. (R. at 34.) Testing needs to be conducted on Sheldrake Pond to determine
whether the lead shot and skeet parts are toxic. Thus, a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Due to this factual dispute, it was
inappropriate for the district court to grant summary judgment
for Suave, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). For purposes of summary judgment facts are to be construed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). Therefore, for purposes of summary judgment, the lead shot and clay parts should be construed
to contain the hazardous waste characteristic of toxicity, thus falling under the hazardous waste classification of the EPA's
regulation.
B. Lead Shot and Skeet Parts That Fall Into and Accumulate
In and Around Sheldrake Pond are Solid Waste Under
the Statutory Definition Because They are Discarded
Materials Resulting From Commercial and
Community Activities
The definition of solid waste for statutory purposes is "any...
discarded material,including... material resulting from commer37
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cial . . . and from community activities." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27)

(1994) (emphasis added). Courts have consistently held that the
statutory definition of solid waste is much broader than the regulatory definition. See, e.g., Comite ProRescate De La Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, 888 F.2d 180 (1st Cir.
1989) (defining 'solid waste' more narrowly for purposes of Subtitle C than for purposes of§ 7002); Conn. Coastal, 989 F.2d at 1316
("the statutory definition contains the concept of 'discarded material' but it does not contain the terms 'abandoned' or 'disposed of
as required by the regulatory definition.") Thus, under the statutory definition, it must only be determined whether lead shot and
skeet are "discarded materials," not whether they have also been
abandoned.
There is no doubt that the skeet shooters have discardedtheir
lead shot and skeet once they attempt to shoot at the skeet. It is
uncontroverted that the skeet shooters never intend to go into
Sheldrake Pond or scour the edge of the pond and retrieve the
spent lead shot and skeet that inevitably fall to the ground and
into Sheldrake Pond.
The discarded materials are also hazardous waste under the
statutory definition. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). In Conn.
Coastal, lead shot was found to be a hazardous solid waste and a
substantial threat to the environment in violation of
§ 6972(a)(1)(B). 989 F.2d at 317. The definition of "hazardous
waste" outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 261.24 remains the same whether
applied to the regulatory or statutory definition of solid waste.
Thus, any "discarded material" that has characteristics of "toxicity" may be deemed hazardous waste, depending upon the level of
toxicity. See id. If Suave argues that there is insufficient evidence that lead shot and skeet parts are a "substantial endangerment," a genuine issue of material fact exists. Thus, summary
judgment is inappropriate, and the case should be remanded for
trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
1.

The Statutory Definition of Solid Waste Does Not
Include A Consumer Use Exception

As earlier noted, there is no codified consumer use exception.
The EPA agrees that this exemption should never apply to the
statutory definition of solid waste. (R. at 8.) More importantly,
this Court held that the consumer use exemption does not apply to
the statutory definition. In Neighborhood against Golf, Inc. v.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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Recreation Enterprises, Inc., 150 F.3d 1029 (12th Cir. 1999)8
("NAG"), the plaintiffs alleged "that golf balls were solid waste
and that toxic components of golf balls, accumulating in the
roughs when their owners could not find them, were leaching into
groundwater, endangering neighborhood drinking water supplies." (R. at 10.) Giving deference to the EPA's interpretation,
the district court held that "the statutory definition of solid waste
does not except consumer products used for their intended purposes," and the Twelfth Circuit affirmed. (R. at 10.)
The district court states that the NAG court incorrectly applied deference and that it is not bound to follow that decision,
even though the district court is within the Twelfth Circuit. (R.
at 10.) In spite of the Twelfth Circuit's binding precedent, the district court contends that adhering to the holding in NAG would
result in an incorrect statutory interpretation. (R. at 10.) The district court provides no analysis for this contention, however, and
its decision is contrary to the long established principle of stare
decisis, making clear that the district court is bound to follow the
Twelfth Circuit's precedent.
The consumer use exception exempts consumer products used
for their intended use. In an analogous case involving a trap
shooting range along Long Island Sound, the court reviewed the
intended use argument as it pertained to a statutory provision in
the CWA. The court stated, "[t]he CWA's broad statutory definition of 'pollutant' has been interpreted to apply to substances
emitted into United States waters, regardless of whether they
have been put to beneficial use or to their intended use." Long
Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. New York Athletic Club of the
City of New York, No. 94 Civ. 0436 (RPP), 1996 WL 131863, *14
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Hudson River Fishermen'sAss'n. v. City
of New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[i]t is indisputable that a pollutant is a pollutant no matter how useful it
may earlier have been"), affd 940 F.2d 649 (1991). The same is
true for discarded solid and hazardous waste. It is irrelevant
what the initial intended use might have been.
2.

Suave's Interpretation of the Statutory Definition of
Solid Waste Would Lead to Absurd Results

Suave's primary argument is that the statutory definition of
solid waste is inapplicable because of the consumer use exemp8. This case is fictitious, but has been provided as part of the record. (R. at 10.)
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tion. (R. at 9.) Suave also argues that there must be an affirmative action of "discarding," otherwise the statutory definition does
not apply. Id. But neither argument holds weight. The logical
extension of Suave's arguments is that Section 7002 could never
apply to non-voluntary acts of depositing, spilling and leaking all of which may cause substantial endangerment to public health
or the environment.
Congress intended the RCRA to fill the gaps in environmental
regulations and in particular provided that the citizen suit provision under Section 7002 should be interpreted broadly to abate
imminent hazards to health or the environment. Conn. Coastal,
989 F.2d at 1315. BOG is bringing this suit against Suave to
abate an imminent hazard to health and the environment and in
doing so performing the function intended by Congress. The district court erred in granting Suave summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this brief, Birdwatchers of Groveton,
Inc., respectfully requests that this Court reverse in its entirety
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor Suave
Real Properties, Inc., and remand this case for further proceedings on the merits.
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[R, 31 [A-l] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW UNION
BIRDWATCHERS OF GROVETON, INC.,
Plaintiff, and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor,

Civ. No. 01-878

V.

SUAVE REAL PROPERTIES, INC.,
Defendant.
Romulus, Judge.
ORDER
On December 20, 2000, Birdwatchers of Groveton, Inc. (BOG),
a non-profit corporation organized under the laws of New Union,
filed a complaint against Suave Real Properties, Inc. (Suave), a
real estate management company organized under the laws of
New Union. BOG alleged jurisdiction under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1365, and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972. BOG alleged that its members are birdwatchers living
and watching birds in Groveton County, New Union. It further
alleged that its members watched birds on Sheldrake Pond from
an adjacent county road for at least the last two decades, until
Suave began using the pond-side area as a firearms and skeet
shooting range in 2000. It further alleged that during those decades, its members observed over two hundred species of birds on
the Pond or its banks, many of which are species that migrate between the United States and Canada and/or Mexico, such as Mexican ducks, jacanas, avocets, sandhill cranes, and warbling vireos.
Sheldrake Pond is a long, narrow, shallow pond, running east to
** Editors Note: Appendix A contains a reproduction of the original hardcopy
record. References to the record that refer to pages in Appendix A are indicated by [A1], [A-2], etc. References made in the other briefs published in this volume refer to
page numbers in the original hardcopy record, which can be found in Appendix A by
the symbols [R. 3], [R. 4], etc. which have been inserted into Appendix A by the
editorial staff of the Pace Environmental Law Review.
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west, that is dry during part of the year and never more than four
feet deep and twenty-five acres in extent during the wet part of
the year. Even so, it is an important stopover for many birds, both
aquatic and terrestrial, during their annual interstate and international migrations.
It is uncontested that Suave began operation in 2000 of the
Groveton Rifle and Pistol Association (GRAPA) near the Pond and
continues that operation today. The GRAPA facility consists of a
pad for skeet shooters, together with a device that ejects skeet into
the air, and a firing range. Suave filled a small portion of the
western end of the Pond to build a platform for the skeet ejection
device. Suave owns land to the west and south of the Pond, and
part of the western end of the Pond. The County owns land to the
east and south of the Pond, and the remainder of the Pond. Suave
ejects skeet over the Pond, while skeet shooters at some remove
from the Pond attempt to shoot the skeet with shotguns. When
they hit the skeet, skeet parts and spent lead shot commonly fall
into and around the Pond, both on Suave-owned and countyowned land and portions of the Pond. When they miss the skeet,
the skeet commonly fall into both portions of the land and Pond
and the spent shot falls similarly. The firing range is located
south of the Pond, near its eastern end. A berm behind the targets
designed to catch most of the spent shot is located about fifty feet
from the Pond. Occasionally lead bullets fired on this range overshoot the berm and enter the Pond or the country's land beyond.
There is no evidence that Suave has an easement over the
County's land or portion of the Pond or other agreement with the
County allowing these invasions of its land or portion of the Pond.
BOG alleges that Suave is violating CWA 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)
in two ways. First, filling and maintaining the fill in the Pond for
the skeet ejection platform constitutes discharging fill material
into navigable waters without a CWA 33 U.S.C. § 1344 permit.
Second, ejection of skeet and firing shot and bullets into the Pond
constitutes either discharging fill material into navigable waters
without a CWA § 1344 permit or discharging pollutants into navigable waters without a CWA 33 U.S.C. § 1342 permit. BOG asks
the court to assess civil penalties for these violations and to issue
an injunction against their continuance. BOG alleges that Suave
is violating RCRA in two ways. First, Suave is violating RCRA by
disposing of hazardous waste (skeet, skeet parts, and lead shot)
into and about the Pond without a RCRA permit, in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 6925(a). BOG asks the court to assess civil penalties for
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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these violations and to issue an injunction against their continuance. Second, Suave's disposal of solid and hazardous waste into
and about the Pond is creating an imminent and substantial endangerment, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). BOG
asks the court to issue an injunction requiring Suave to abate this
endangerment. EPA has intervened in support of BOG in its CWA
counts and the second part of its RCRA count.
These allegations raise numerous factual and legal issues. At
this point, however, we are called on to decide only a few of them
in response to a motion for summary judgment filed by Suave.
First, Suave moves that we dismiss the CWA counts because Sheldrake Pond is not navigable water, either in a statutory or a constitutional sense. Second, Suave moves that we dismiss the RCRA
counts because the use of skeet and lead shot for their intended
purpose does not constitute disposal of waste. The United States
intervened to oppose the first motion and to support and oppose
different parts of the second. We grant both motions and dismiss
the case.
I.
A.

The CWA Counts

Legal Background

The basic prohibition of the CWA is the addition of fill material or a pollutant to navigable water from a point source without
a CWA permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362 (12).
"Navigable
water" is defined in the CWA to be the "waters of the United
States." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). The legislative history of the statute indicates that Congress intended the term to be interpreted to
exercise the full extent of _ongressional constitutional authority.
Conf. Rep. 92-1236, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3822.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which administers
most of the CWA, including the § 1342 pollutant permitting program, has interpreted the term in its regulations to include intrastate waters, such as "playa lakes," which could affect interstate
or foreign commerce. Such uses include use by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational purposes. 40 CFR § 122.2. The
Army Corps of Engineers (COE), which adnmiinisters the CWA's
§ 1344 fill permitting program, has similarly interpreted the term.
33 CFR § 328.3(a)(3). A playa lake is a lake that is intermittent,
i.e., it is dry part of the year. There are a number of such lakes in
the arid southwest. BOG argues that Sheldrake Pond is a playa
lake. Suave argues that it is too small to be a lake, that it is
43
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merely a "vernal pool," a pool that is wet in the spring and dry the
rest of the year. EPA has not specifically included vernal pools
within its definition of navigable water, probably because they are
too small. Nor has the COE. BOG argues further that Sheldrake
Pond is used in interstate commerce as part of an interstate and
international bird migration pathway between the Gulf of Mexico
and further south to the northern Great Plains and further north,
by migrating birds and by people watching the migratory birds for
recreational purposes. Significantly, the COE has interpreted its
regulatory definition of navigable waters to include waters that
"are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by the Migratory Bird Treaties." 51 Fed. Reg. 41217 ("Migratory Bird Rule").
Suave argues bird flight is not commerce and that birdwatching at
Sheldrake Pond is not part of interstate commerce because only
BOG's members are alleged to watch birds there and they are intrastate birdwatchers.
These arguments are illuminated by recent judicial and legislative actions. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
U. S.__, 121 S.Ct. 675 (2001)
(SWANCC), the Court considered an almost identical legal and
factual situation. There, as here, the water in question was isolated, with no allegation it had ever been or could ever be used for
traditional navigation purposes or that it was connected in any
way with such waters. The only difference was that the water at
issue in SWANCC was a flooded gravel pit, that was always wet,
and the water at issue here is a playa pond, which is intermittently wet. On January 9, 2001, the Court held that such insignificant and isolated waters were not within the congressional
definition of navigable water. The Court reasoned that "waters of
the United States" did not include all water or the definition
would have no meaning beyond "water." It further reasoned that
the "navigable" in "navigable water" had to have some meaning as
well. Finally, it found no indication in either the statute or the
legislative history that Congress intended to include such insignificant and isolated waters within its definition of navigable waters.
Notwithstanding the lower court's finding that over a billion dollars a year is spent on migratory bird-based recreational activities, the Court commented that the "Migratory Bird Rule" invoked
the "outer limits of Congress' power" under the Commerce clause.
Id. At 683. Rather than addressing the constitutional issue of
whether it was within Congress' Commerce Clause authority, it
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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interpreted that statute not to assert jurisdiction over such insignificant and isolated waters.
On August 15, 2001, Congress amended the CWA's definition
of "navigable waters" to incorporate EPA's definition of the "waters of the United States" from 40 CFR § 122.2. See Water Pollution Protection Act of 2001, P.L. 106-720. 9 The Report of the
Senate Environment Committee accompanying the Senate bill
stated:
The Supreme Court's opinion in Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, -

U.S.

__

(2001), misinterpreted congressional intent. When we first enacted the CWA in 1972, we intended that the terms "navigable
waters" and "waters of the United States" extend as far as our
Commerce Clause authority extends. We intended the terms to
cover isolated waters that are important stopovers for migratory
birds. We acknowledged then and reacknowledge today, that
migratory birds, particularly migratory game birds, are instrumentalities of interstate commerce and that the flyways they
use to migrate are highways of interstate commerce. Hundreds
of thousands of our citizens travel across state boundaries to
hunt them and carry their carcasses across state boundaries for
food, competing with our billion-dollar interstate domesticated
fowl industry. Migratory birds are objects sought by hundreds
of thousands of our citizens for recreational observation. Both of
these activities result in over a billion dollars annually in interstate expenditures. Not only the Commerce Clause justifies our
jurisdiction to protect these waters, the Treaty Clause justifies
it as well. We have entered into treaties with several nations to
protect migratory birds, including their habitat. Waters used by
such species during migration are essential to their survival.
S. Rep. 106-528, p. 23.10
B.

Legal Analysis

The 2001 amendment is irrelevant to this case. It is commonplace that the statutory law that governs a case is the statutory
law that exists at the time the complaint is filed, unless the statute explicitly directs that it be applied retrospectively. There is no
such direction in the 2001 amendments. The complaint was filed
more than eight months prior to the amendments. Although
9. This enactment exists only for the purposes of this Competition.
10. This Report exists only for the purposes of this Competition.
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plaintiff argues that the Senate Report quoted above indicates a
congressional intent that the amendments be applied retrospectively, it does not. The statute itself does not embody retroactivity, only the report of one chamber of Congress does so. Neither
the Conference Committee Report nor the House Committee Report contains similar language, indeed, they are silent on this issue. The plaintiffs next argue that the Senate Report is a
definitive indication of what Congress intended by its use of "navigable waters" and "waters of the United States" when it enacted
the CWA in 1972. Of course, it is not. Few, if any, of the members
of Congress in 1972 were still members of Congress in 2001. And
it is commonplace that the views of a later Congress are of no help
in ascertaining the intent of an earlier Congress. That is particularly true when the Court itself has told us what congressional
intent was in the earlier enactment, as it has in SWANCC. Since
the statute that controls is the pre-amendment statute and the
Court has interpreted that statute not to cover insignificant and
isolated waters such as Sheldrake Pond, we need go no further.
But if the plaintiff prevailed in its arguments, either that the
amendments controlled this case or that the Senate Report indicated the congressional intent in 1972 was to regulate isolated waters like those at issue in this case, then we would reach the
constitutional question that the Court avoided in SWANCC. In
that event, we would hold that Congress exceeded its authority
when it attempted to exercise its jurisdiction over insignificant,
isolated playa ponds such as Sheldrake Pond. We start with the
Court's observation in SWANCC that such an attempt would raise
"significant constitutional and federalism questions." Id. at 684.
They are, of course, the same questions considered by the Court
recently in holding that a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-based violence and a federal offense for possession of a firearm
in a school zone were unconstitutional. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
In both decisions, the Court reiterated the three categories of
activity that Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause:
1) highways of interstate commerce; 2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and 3) activities substantially affected by interstate commerce. Morrison at 608-9; Lopez at 558. Plaintiff first
argues that Sheldrake Lake is part of a highway of interstate commerce, i.e., part of a migratory bird flyway. This argument sweeps
too broadly. Since migratory birds can land virtually anywhere in
the country, it would make the land and water of the whole counhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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try subject to federal regulation, obliterating the traditional state
control over land and water use decisions that underlies our federalist division of powers between the two levels of government.
Plaintiff then argues that migratory birds are instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1919). Plaintiffs attempted use of Missouri v. Holland is misplaced in two respects. First, the Court did not hold that migratory birds were instrumentalities of interstate commerce, but
merely that they were not property of the state and thus not immune from federal control. Second, the statute and regulations at
issue in that case protected migratory birds from being killed, captured or sold, while the CWA regulates water pollution.
That leads to BOG's third argument: either that defendant's
activities substantially affect the interstate commerce of hunting
and observing migratory birds or that the aggregate of activities
like defendant's substantially affects such commerce. Plaintiff
has utterly failed to plead or prove facts sufficient to establish the
first of these alternatives: no human interstate activity has been
alleged at Sheldrake Pond. As to the second, the Court in both
Morrison and Lopez acknowledged that a non-economic activity
might, in the aggregate, sufficiently affect interstate commerce to
justify regulation under the Commerce Clause. But in both cases
the Court found that no such affect had been proven. Here the
only proof plaintiff offers is the Senate Report quoted above. Of
course this does not suffice to prove a factual issue. In Morrison
the Court rejected specific congressional findings that possession
of guns within a school zone affected interstate commerce, finding
that just because Congress said so, does not make it so. It held
that such factual issues were for courts to decide on real evidence.
Morrison at 614. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence on this
point beyond the Senate Report, which, of course, does not rise to
even the level of congressional findings. Nor does the plaintiffs
reliance on the Court of Appeal's decision in SWANCC or in U.S.
Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 732-44 ( 3 rd Cir. 1993) help; both were obliterated by the Court's opinion in SWANCC.
Plaintiffs contention that the Treaty Clause justifies congressional usurpation of state authority over insignificant and isolated
waters such as Sheldrake Pond, is a misplaced attempt to end-run
its inability to exercise jurisdiction over those waters under the
Commerce Clause. A treaty simply cannot transfer state authority to the federal government. Nor is there any indication that the
treaties protecting migratory birds attempted to do so. Nor is
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PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

there any indication that Congress was acting pursuant to the
Treaty Clause when it enacted the CWA. The Senate Committee
may have thought it was doing so when enacting the 2001 amendments, but that is a far cry from Congress exercising such
authority.
We therefore hold that the statutory definition of navigable
waters controlling this case does not reach the insignificant and
isolated waters of Sheldrake Pond. If it did, we would hold that
Congress and EPA exceeded their constitutional authority in attempting to extend their jurisdiction to Sheldrake Pond. Accordingly, we dismiss BOG's CWA counts.
II. The RCRA ISSUES
BOG seeks a finding that 1) Suave is violating RCRA by disposing of shot and skeet parts, hazardous waste, on and about its
Sheldrake Pond facility without a permit, actionable under 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) and 2) the disposed shot and skeet parts,
solid or hazardous waste, constitute an imminent and substantial
endangerment, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). To
make either of these findings, it is necessary to hold that the fired
shot and skeet parts are solid waste, for hazardous waste is a subset of solid waste. This is a more complicated exercise that it
might appear, for there are two definitions of "solid waste" that
could be relevant. First, Congress defined solid waste as ". . . discarded material... resulting from industrial, commercial, mining
and agricultural operations, and from community activities." 42
U.S.C. § 6903(27). Second, EPA has promulgated a definition of
solid waste at 40 CFR § 261.2(b) that again defines it as "discarded material," and then defines "discarded material" in a long
and complex manner. Courts, and even EPA officials, have commented that this definition is an incomprehensible quagmire. The
D.C. Circuit, for instance, has characterized it as a "mind-numbing journey." American Mining Congress v. U.S. EPA, 824 F.2d
1177, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987). As it turns out, the second, regulatory, definition applies to allegations of violating RCRA's regulatory program under § 6972(a)(1)(A), and the first, statutory,
definition applies to allegations that activities constitute imminent and substantial endangerments under § 6972(a)(1)(B). Connecticut Coastal Fishmeren'sAssociation v. Remington Arms Co.,
Inc., 989 F.2d 1305 (2 nd Cir. 1993). See also Long Island
Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. New York Athletic Club of the City of
New York, 1996 WL 131863 (S.D.N.Y.). The Second Circuit's reahttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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soning in this regard is complicated but impeccable, and we see no
reason to repeat it here. Suave argues that using a consumer
product for its intended use does not constitute disposal of the
product under either definition. It further argues that shot, like a
golf ball, is not discarded when it is fired and falls to the ground,
for that is its intended use. EPA agrees that the "consumer use"
exception applies to the regulatory definition of solid waste for
purposes of § 6972(a)(1)(A), but argues that it does not apply to
the statutory definition of solid waste for purposes of
§ 6972(a)(1)(B).
Complicating this issue is the "military munitions rule," 40
CFR § 261.2(a)(2)(iv), § 266.202. The rule was upheld in Military
Toxics Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Relevant
portions of this rule essentially say that fired military munitions
that land on a military firing range are not solid waste in the regulatory sense, but may be solid waste in the statutory sense if they
land off the firing range. Happily, both Suave and BOG agree
that the rule is irrelevant because it deals only with military
munitions, which are not the focus of this case. While EPA agrees
that the military munitions rule does not govern this case, it argues that the principles embodied in it govern the interpretation
of both the statutory and regulatory definitions of solid waste. According to EPA, the exclusion embodies the Agency's consistent
interpretation of the regulatory definition of solid waste as excluding commercial products used for their intended use, if their ordinary use results in their landing on the ground. Thus EPA
interprets its regulatory definition of solid waste to exclude shot
landing on the GRAPA firing range, for firing shot on a firing
range is using shot for its intended purpose. And it interprets the
statutory definition to cover shot landing off the firing range as in
the military munitions rule. Under this interpretation it is important to find whether the portion of the Pond owned by the County
is part of the skeet and firing ranges. But if the intended use of
the ammunition at issue here is to shoot skeet or to shoot at a
target, this court fails to understand why that purpose is accomplished when the shot lands on a firing range but is not accomplished when it lands off the range. We therefore agree with the
principle parties to this case that the military munitions rule is
not useful in making the required interpretation.
Suave and EPA argue that EPA's interpretation of its own
regulation defining solid waste as not including consumer products used for their intended purposes is dispositive, absent a con49
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flict with the statute or regulation. We agree and find that BOG
has raised no such conflict to prevent that conclusion. Suave next
argues that the statutory definition of solid waste should be interpreted to exclude consumer products used for their intended purposes as well. If materials do not warrant regulation as solid
waste, neither do they warrant remedial activities as solid waste.
There is a good deal of common sense in this argument and it has
the great merit of consistency, a special virtue in a statutory and
regulatory structure as complicated as RCRA's. Indeed, the decisions BOG cites in its argument against this conclusion interpret
different sections of RCRA consistently for this very reason. But
BOG and EPA argue that EPA's interpretation of the statutory
definition to exclude the consumer use exception bars this approach, for EPA's interpretation is entitled to substantial deference. Their argument carried great weight under Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984), in which the Court held that if a statute was ambiguous
and the implementing agency's interpretation of it was reasonable, its interpretation was entitled to great deference. But the
Court has recently limited Chevron deference to agency interpretations that are embodied in rulemakings. U.S. v. Mead Corp.,
2001 WL 672258 (U.S.). Under Mead, agency interpretations not
embodied in rulemakings are entitled only to such respect as may
be warranted by the formality of the agency's determination, the
consistency of the agency's interpretation and its persuasiveness.
BOG and EPA seek to cloak EPA's interpretation of the statutory definition with Chevron substantial deference rather than
Mead relative respect using two arguments. First, they argue
that EPA's definition is indeed embodied in a rule, 40 CFR
261.1(b)(2)(ii). But that rule only provides that the statutory definition of "solid waste" applies to the EPA imminent and substantial endangerment provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6972, and does not
mention the citizen suit imminent and substantial endangerment
provision that BOG invokes, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). Nevertheless, BOG argues "solid waste" should be interpreted identically in
both provisions because the provisions are otherwise very similar,
citing Connecticut Coastal Fishermen'sAssociation v. Remington
Arms Co., Inc., 989 F.2d 1305 ( 2nd Cir. 1993), and Comite Pro

Rescate de la Salud v. PuertoRico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 888
F.2d 180, 187 (1st Cir. 1990). We agree, for the same reason that
we held that both the statutory and regulatory definitions should
be interpreted to include the consumer use exception. But this
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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does not help BOG, for EPA's regulation merely says that the statutory definition applies to EPA imminent and substantial endangerment causes of action and by extension to similar citizen suit
causes of action; it does not deal with whether the consumer use
exception applies to the statutory definition of solid waste. In
sum, it is irrelevant to the issue before us. Thus, absent a countervailing argument, under Mead Corp. EPA's interpretation that
the statutory definition of solid waste does not include a consumer
use exception is entitled only to relative respect, not substantial
deference.
BOG and EPA next argue that our Circuit has already decided that EPA's interpretation that the statutory definition of
solid waste does not include a consumer use exception and that
decision must be followed under principles of stare decisis. In
Neighborhood against Golf, Inc. v. Recreation Enterprises, Inc.,
150 F.3d 1029 ( 1 2 th Cir. 1999) (NAG), 1 a neighborhood association filed a multi-count complaint seeking to enjoin the operation
of a golf course that disrupted the neighborhood in various ways.
One count alleged that golf balls were solid waste and that toxic
components of golf balls, accumulating in the roughs when their
owners could not find them, were leaching into groundwater, endangering neighborhood drinking water supplies. Recreation Enterprises argued the golf balls were not solid waste because they
were consumer products used for their intended purpose and
hence they were not disposed. The district court rejected this argument, giving Chevron deference to EPA's interpretation that
the statutory definition of solid waste did not except consumer
products used for their intended purposes, and the Twelfth Circuit
affirmed in NAG.
It now appears that NAG wrongly applied deference rather
than respect to EPA's interpretation of RCRA. BOG argues that
NAG nevertheless is controlling precedent in the Twelfth Circuit.
Here BOG and EPA part company. Suave and EPA argue that
this cannot be, for such a conclusion would forever bar courts in
the Circuit from correct statutory interpretation. This Court
agrees.
That leads to the final question: to what degree of respect is
EPA's interpretation of the statute entitled? Mead Corp. sets
forth a three-pronged inquiry to determine this. First, how formal
was the process in which EPA made the interpretation? EPA did
11. This opinion exists only for the purposes of this Competition.
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not develop its interpretation in any formal process. Second, how
consistent has EPA been in its interpretation? EPA's interpretation has been inconsistent. EPA's application of the consumer use
exception to the regulatory but not the statutory definition of solid
waste is basically inconsistent. Moreover, EPA's interpretation of
"discarded," the key word and concept in both definitions, has
been inconsistent even in its interpretation for purposes of the
regulatory definition. American Petroleum Institute v. U.S. EPA,
216 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Association of Battery Manufacturers
v. U.S. EPA, 208 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2000); American Petroleum
Institute v. U.S. EPA, 906 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990); American
Mining Congress v. U.S. EPA, 907 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
American Mining Congress v. U.S. EPA, 824 F2d 1177 (D.C. Cir.
1987). Third, how persuasive is EPA's interpretation? EPA is
very persuasive that Congress did not intend RCRA to regulate
the use of consumer products for their intended purposes. The
very reason for RCRA's regulatory program is to prevent endangerments. If Congress did not intend EPA to regulate the use of
consumer products for their intended purposes to prevent endangerments, it is unlikely that Congress would intend the courts to
ameliorate endangerments from the same use of those products.
Therefore, we find EPA's interpretation of the statutory definition
of solid waste to exclude the consumer use exception to be entitled
to little, if any, respect.
In sum, we hold that EPA's interpretation is entitled to no
deference under Chevron because it is not embodied in a rulemaking. Further, we hold that it is entitled to no respect under Mead
Corp. because it was not developed in a formal process, has not
been consistent, and is unpersuasive. For the very reasons that
EPA's interpretation is unpersuasive, we hold that the consumer
use exemption applies to both the statutory and regulatory interpretations of "solid waste." Accordingly, we dismiss BOG's RCRA
counts.
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APPENDIX B
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
AND REGULATIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3:
The Commerce Clause states that Congress has the power "To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18:
The Necessary and Proper Clause states that Congress has the
power "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof'
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2:
The President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur"
STATUTES
CLEAN WATER ACT
33 USC § 1251. Congressional Declaration of Goals and
Policy
(d) Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency to administer 33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act [33 USCS §§ 1251 et seq.], the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter in this Act
called "Administrator") shall administer this Act [33 USCS
§§ 1251 et seq.].
33 USC § 1311. Effluent limitations
(a) Illegality of pollutant discharges except in compliance with
law. Except as in compliance with this section and sections 302,
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306, 307, 318, 402, and 404 of this Act [33 USCS §§ 1312, 1316,
1317, 1328, 1342, 1344], the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.
33 USC § 1362. Definitions
(7) The term "navigable waters" means the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.
(12) The term "discharge of a pollutant" and the term "discharge of
pollutants" each means (A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any
point source other than a vessel or other floating craft.
Water Pollution Control Act Amendment of 2001, P.L. 106720.
"On August 15, 2001, Congress Amended the CWA's definition of
'navigable waters' to incorporate the EPA's definition of the 'waters of the United States' from 40 CFR § 122.2. R. at 3. (Note that
this amendment is fictional and only exists for the purpose this
competition).
RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT
42 USC § 6903. Definitions
(27) The term "solid waste" means any garbage, refuse, sludge
from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or
air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural
operations, and from community activities, but does not include
solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges
which are point sources subject to permits under section 402 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended (86 Stat. 880)
[33 USCS § 1342], or source, special nuclear, or byproduct material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (68
Stat. 923) [42 USCS §§ 2011 et seq.].
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42 USC § 6925. Permits for Treatment, Storage, or
Disposal of Hazardous Waste
(a) Permit requirements. Not later than eighteen months after
the date of the enactment of this section [enacted Oct. 21, 19761,
the administrator shall promulgate regulations requiring each
person owning or operating an existing facility or planning to construct a new facility for the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste identified or listed under this subtitle [42 USCS
§§ 6921 et seq.], to have a permit issued pursuant to this section.
Such regulations shall take effect on the date provided in section
3010 [42 USCS § 69301 and upon and after such date the treatment, storage, or disposal of any such hazardous waste and the
construction of any new facility for the treatment, storage, or disposal of any such hazardous waste is prohibited except in accordance with such a permit. .. "
42 USC § 6972. Citizen Suits
(a) In general. Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this
section, any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf(1) (A) against any person (including (a) the United States, and (b)
any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is
alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this Act [42 USCS §§ 6901 et seq.]; or
(B) against any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and including
any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past
or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal
facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or
present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal
of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment; or
REGULATIONS
33 C.F.R. § 328.3. Definitions
For the purpose of this regulation these terms are defined as
follows:
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(a) The term waters of the United States means
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past,
or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce,
including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for
recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by industries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the
United States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a) (1) through
(4) of this section;
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a) (1) through (6) of this
section.
40 CFR § 122.2. Definitions
Waters of the United States or waters of the U.S. means:
(a) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or
may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(b) All interstate waters, including interstate "wetlands;"
(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, "wetlands,"
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds the use, degradation, or destruction of which would affect or
could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such
waters:
(1) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for
recreational or other purposes;
(2) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce; or
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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(3) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce;
(d) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the
United States under this definition;
(e) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a) through (d)
of this definition;
(f) The territorial sea; and
(g) "Wetlands" adjacent to waters (other than waters that are
themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a) through (f) of
this definition.
40 CFR § 261.24. Toxicity characteristic
(a) A solid waste exhibits the characteristic of toxicity if, using the
Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure, test Method 1311 in
"Test Methods for Evaluating Solid Waste, Physical/Chemical
Methods," EPA Publication SW-846, as incorporated by reference
in § 260.11 of this chapter, the extract from a representative sample of the waste contains any of the contaminants listed in table 1
at the concentration equal to or greater than the respective value
given in that table. Where the waste contains less than 0.5 percent filterable solids, the waste itself, after filtering using the
methodology outlined in Method 1311, is considered to be the extract for the purpose of this section.
40 CFR § 261.1(b)(1).
"The definition of solid waste contained in this part applies only to
wastes that also are hazardous for purposes of the regulations implementing subtitle C of RCRA. For example, it does not apply to
materials (such as non-hazardous scrap, paper, textiles, or rubber)
that are not otherwise hazardous wastes and that are recycled."
40 C.F.R. § 261.2. Definition of solid waste
(a)(1) A solid waste is any discarded material that is not excluded
by § 261.4(a) or that is not excluded by variance granted under
§§ 260.30 and 260.31.
(2) A discarded material is any material which is:
(i) Abandoned, as explained in paragraph (b) of this section; or
(ii) Recycled, as explained in paragraph (c) of this section; or
(iii) Considered inherently waste-like, as explained in paragraph
(d) of this section; or
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(iv) A military munition identified as a solid waste in 40 CFR
266.202.
(b) Materials are solid waste if they are abandoned by being:
(1) Disposed of; or
(2) Burned or incinerated; or
(3) Accumulated, stored, or treated (but not recycled) before or in
lieu of being abandoned by being disposed of, burned, or
incinerated
(c) Materials are solid wastes if they are recycled - or accumulated, stored, or treated before recycling - as specified in
paragraphs (c)(1) through (4) of this section.
(1) Used in a manner constituting disposal. (i) Materials noted
with a "" in Column 1 of Table I are solid wastes when they are:

(A) Applied to or placed on the land in a manner that constitutes
disposal; or
(B) Used to produce products that are applied to or placed on the
land or are otherwise contained in products that are applied to or
placed on the land (in which cases the product itself remains a
solid waste).
(ii) However, commercial chemical products listed in § 261.33 are
not solid wastes if they are applied to the land and that is their
ordinary manner of use. ..

."

40 CFR § 266.202. Definition of solid waste
(a) A military munition is not a solid waste when:
(1) Used for its intended purpose, including:
(i) Use in training military personnel or explosives and munitions
emergency response specialists (including training in proper destruction of unused propellant or other munitions); or
(ii) Use in research, development, testing, and evaluation of military munitions, weapons, or weapon systems; or
(iii) Recovery, collection, and on-range destruction of unexploded
ordnance and munitions fragments during range clearance activities at active or inactive ranges. However, "use for intended purpose" does not include the on-range disposal or burial of
unexploded ordnance and contaminants when the burial is not a
result of product use. ..
51 Fed. Reg. 41206. Section 328.3: Definitions
This section incorporates the definitions previously found in
§ 323.3 (a), (c), (d), (f) and (g). Paragraphs (c), (d), (f) and (g) were
incorporated without change. EPA has clarified that waters of the
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/18
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United States at 40 CFR 328.3(a)(3) also include the following
waters:
a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by
Migratory Bird Treaties; or
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds
which cross state lines; or
c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species;
or
d. d. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.

59

